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ABSTRACT
The distinction between reversible and irreversible phenomena in biological information systems provides a basis for distinguishing microevolution from macroevolution. Biological transitions encompass the entire class of irreversible changes in biological systems, including physiological and developmental phenomena. Evolutionary transitions are the subset of biological transitions that have an
impact on the quality and quantity of biological information transmitted to future generations. Evolutionary transitions are manifested empirically as macroevolutionary changes, i.e. evolutionary changes
that can be detected only through phylogenetic analysis among groups of species sharing a unique
common ancestry.

1

TWO RECENT PERSPECTIVES

The past 20 years have witnessed significant conceptual breakthroughs in understanding
the fundamental nature of biological systems, and their evolutionary fate over space and
through time (see, e.g., references in Brooks, 2000, 2001 and in this contribution). I believe that such conceptual advances (the ‘text’ of biological theory) must become embedded in ongoing empirical biological research (the ‘context’ of biological theory) if they
are to have lasting impact. In this contribution, I will first discuss two complementary
conceptual views of biological evolution, that of Brooks and Wiley (1988) and of Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995). I will then propose a simplified taxonomy of biological and evolutionary transitions stemming from those views, within which the ‘major
transitions’ of Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) nest. Finally, I will briefly discuss
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some current empirical research programmes in macroevolution that can contribute directly to the discovery and evaluation of evolutionary transitions.
...there are two factors: namely, the nature of the organism and the nature of the conditions. The former seems to be much more the important for nearly similar variations
sometimes arise under, as far as we can judge, dissimilar conditions; and, on the other
hand, dissimilar variations arise under conditions which appear to be nearly uniform.
(Darwin 1872: 32 [italics added]).

A necessary first step in encouraging working biologists to consider novel explanations for their findings is to show how such explanations (and the conceptual framework
from which they stem) extend and improve the existing framework. The above statement
by Darwin in the 6th edition of Origin of Species is a good starting point. The development of Neo-Darwinian thought during the second half of the 20th century, however, emphasized the nature of the conditions rather than the nature of the organism, often to such
an extent that neo-Darwinian explanations began to sound very Lamarckian indeed.
Gould and Lewontin (1979) emphasized this trend in calling research on adaptive evolution ‘Panglossian.’
Two recent proposals from within evolutionary biology attempt to bring the nature
of the organism back to centre stage in evolutionary biology. Both of these proposals
have found it convenient to couch their discussions in terms of the dynamics of information. Brooks and Wiley (1988; Brooks, 2000, 2001) suggested that evolution is caused by
the entropic increase in biological information within genetic (more properly ‘inheritance
systems’: Jablonka and Lamb, 1995) phase space constrained historically, due to both
internal (nature of the organism, or ‘text’) and external (nature of the conditions, or ‘context’) factors. They characterized evolution as stochastically generated yet having irreversible increases in informational complexity, including the emergence of new levels of
organization, each of which is accompanied by the emergence of a novel form of ‘cohesion’, a class of material properties linking parts into wholes. Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) proposed that major transitions in evolution are caused by the evolution of
increased efficiency of storing and transmitting information. Major transitions are characterized by contingently irreversible emergence of new levels of organization and increased complexity. One outcome of these transitions are changes that ameliorate ‘conflicts of interest’ (those aspects of the nature of the conditions comprising the selection
arena) arising from the independently evolved ‘nature of the organism’ for each species.
Both views converge on a common perspective: there are no strictly macroevolutionary
or strictly microevolutionary processes. Rather, there are a variety of evolutionary proc-
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esses, with different manifestations on different spatial and temporal scales and at different levels of biological organization (see also Maurer, 1991; Gould, 1995; Conway Morris, 1995). This means there is no single objective spatial or temporal scale for studying
evolution, and evolutionary studies need to focus on finding the appropriate scale for invoking particular explanations. For this, we need a meta-theory to integrate microevolution and macroevolution.
That meta-theory comes from considering biological information as a statistical
mechanical phenomenon. All evolutionary dynamics are statistical in nature, forming
microstates (organisms and groups of organisms) that can be described ecologically by
something like the Hutchinson niche and in evolutionary terms by demes and populations. The statistical summation over all members of any evolutionary lineage (a ‘community of descent’ sensu Darwin, 1872) are the macrostates, which can be described
ecologically by something like the Elton niche and in evolutionary terms by Simpson’s
(1944, 1953) Evolutionary Species Concept (see also Wiley, 1981) and his view of adaptive zones, embodying a fundamental duality in which macroscopic biological systems
were simultaneously genealogical and ecological entities—hence his use of the term
Quantum Evolution (for an excellent review of the debate within mainstream evolutionary biology about micro- and macroevolution see Eldredge) (Eldredge, 1985).
As noted above, Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) proposed that the major
transitions in evolution are characterized by the evolution of increased efficiency of storing and transmitting information. Brooks and Wiley (1988) proposed that cohesive properties, ranging from molecular affinities to cell-cell adhesion to genetic compatibility,
mate recognition, and genealogy, are analogous to inertia in physical systems, and are
essential in allowing the emergence and persistence of macroscopic properties. The major
transitions in evolution discussed by Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) are all associated with the emergence of new forms of cohesion, which permit information to be
stored and transmitted more efficiently. It is in the recognition of the significance of cohesive properties that we find the key to understanding microstate/macrostate distinctions
in biological systems. A recent discussion of the nature of species illustrates this point.

2

THE NATURE OF SPECIES

Species comprise historical lineages forming ‘communities of descent’ (Darwin, 1859,
1872) that comprise, at any given time, spatially-distributed complex information systems
(Brooks and Wiley, 1988; Brooks & McLennan, 2002). Kornet (1993a,b; Kornet and
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McAllister, 1993; Kornet et al., 1995) added an important dimension to this perspective.
Viewing species as historical lineages subdivided into smaller historical lineages extending through time she proposed that when one of these smaller lineages experiences a
permanent, or irreversible, split from the others, the relationship between that lineage and
the others changes from a microevolutionary to a macroevolutionary one. The divergent
lineage is called a macrospecies to indicate that permanent split from its ancestor and
may now produce its own complement of smaller lineages extending through time, which
constitute its own microspecies.
‘Microspecies’ is a general term encompassing all those assemblages of conspecific
organisms that biologists have called demes, subspecies, differentiated populations, geographical races, or incipient species. Two implications link these terms. First, the group
of organisms being considered can be distinguished objectively in some manner relevant
to the dynamics of inherited biological information. Second, there is a probability that
this group will become a (macro)species in its own right, but has not done so yet (an
event often difficult to determine empirically). Microspecies thus represent the realm of
what is happening right now and the realm of possibilities for the future. The microspecies of any given macrospecies may be relatively numerous and locally differentiated yet
highly similar due to their close common history, so naturally replicated exemplars will
abound, including the locally adapted populations of Williams (1992) and the coevolutionary mosaic of Thompson (1994).
Demographic phenomena, such as local extinctions and fusions with other microspecies as a result of dispersal and gene flow, limit the number of microspecies that
become macrospecies in their own right. This is exactly the emerging pattern in studies of
Phylogeography (Avise, 2000). Phylogeographers are interested in describing the “deployment of genetic variation within species” (Zink 1996:308). This deployment is uncovered by reconstructing phylogenetic relationships among populations then examining
the effects of relatedness (phylogeny) and geography on differences in the genetic structure of those populations (microspecies). One major generalization arising from these
studies is that relationships among populations within a species are complex and reticulated, often showing only moderate to very little differentiation, as indicated by the occurrence of numerous, equally parsimonious or statistically indistinguishable phylogenetic trees. Although relationships among microspecies are often ambiguous, many phylogeographic studies have detected statistically significant groups of populations which
exhibit unambiguous phylogenetic relationships among themselves.
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Kornet’s criterion of reversible and irreversible splits for distinguishing microspecies from macrospecies thus provides a clear component differentiation in micro- and
macroevolution. That component is not one of magnitude, but of quality. It embodies the
quality of the cohesion holding the microspecies together as a single ‘collective entity’, as
well as time and history. New macrospecies are the fundamental products of evolutionary
transitions. As Futuyma (1989) suggested, population/demic-level changes are likely to
have no net evolutionary impact unless they are partitioned by speciation, meaning the
production of new macrospecies. Thus, while there may only be one fundamental kind of
evolution, there can be two fundamental kinds of evolutionary outcomes, reversible ones
and irreversible ones. I propose that biological transitions encompass the entire class of
irreversible changes, including physiological and developmental phenomena, and that
evolutionary transitions are the subset of those irreversible changes that have an impact
on the quality and quantity of biological information transmitted to future generations.

3

CLASSES OF EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITIONS

Evolutionary transitions encompass a wide range of irreversible phenomena in biology, but not all evolutionary transitions produce equally significant outcomes. Therefore,
it might be fruitful to attempt to classify various kinds of transitions. Brooks and McLennan (2002) characterized three categories of evolutionary transitions thus:
Category 1: Playing the game, or taking advantage of opportunities permitted by
the game
Such evolutionary transitions are the easiest to achieve (least costly in time and genetic
change), yet provide the least evolutionary payoff in terms of diversification. They require only altered environmental conditions, such as geographic isolation leading to
speciation. To return to Darwin, such transitions require only a change in the nature of
the conditions, and not the nature of the organism. Janzen (1985) generalized this with his
concept of ecological fitting. For example, most biologists also believe that parasitism is
a one-way street, so that once a lineage becomes parasitic, it remains parasitic until or
unless it goes extinct. Siddall et al. (1993), however, showed that the common ancestor of
the diplomonad flagellates was parasitic, and that within the group Hexamita inflata and
members of Trepomonas have reverted to the free-living mode of existence. What makes
this case congruent with ecological fitting is the recognition that all free-living diplomonads live in anaerobic aquatic sediments which often contain high levels of decaying organic matter and their associated bacteria, similar to the intestinal environments in which
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their relatives live. In other words, the ‘nature of the conditions’ for both free-living parasitic species in this group are similar enough that the division between ‘parasitic’ and
‘free-living’ is almost arbitrary. Similarly, Trouvé et al. (1998) reported that the life history traits of parasitic flatworms are most similar to the life history traits of their freeliving relatives, indicating that these species do not have a ‘parasitic’ but rather a ‘platyhelminth’ (phylum Platyhelminthes, also known as flatworms, including the familiar freeliving forms called planarians and parasitic forms called flukes and tapeworms) mode of
life which functions well in a host-parasite context. Thus, even the adoption of a new
mode of life, whose outcome is highly significant in evolutionary terms, may not require
an equally significant origin.
Category 2: Changing the rules of the game – changing the dimensions of the evolutionary arena
Ross (1972) established a major component of the foundation of historical ecology when
he discovered that only approximately one out of every thirty speciation events for a variety of insect groups was correlated with shifts from the plesiomorphic (ancestral) ecology
to any apomorphic (derived) ecology. Ross concluded that though such shifts were important components of insect community structure and complexity, they occurred much
less frequently than the origin of new species. Furthermore, he felt that there were no
predictable patterns explaining the shifts that did occur and suggested that ecological diversification in evolution comprised a biological ‘uncertainty principle’. In other words,
we cannot predict when and where a new set of rules for playing the ‘game’ of surviving
and reproducing in a given ecosystem will evolve, though we can document their origin
and subsequent effects.
Category 3: Changing the game—creating new evolutionary arenas
This type of evolutionary transition involves explanations for the origins of major modes
of life that also depend on specialized morphology, behavior, or ecology often correlated
with special conditions. The most fundamental of these transitions, as recognized by
Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) is the origin of life itself (see also Wicken, 1987;
Depew and Weber, 1995). Such transitions are the most difficult to achieve, because they
require the conjunction of at least two innovations, each one improbable in itself. (Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) noted that such conjunctions would be sufficient to
make such transitions effectively irreversible, at least long enough to serve as constraints
on future evolution (Brooks and Wiley 1988; Brooks, 2001). As great as the ‘cost’ (difficulty) of achieving such innovations, the evolutionary payoff for such transitions can be
11

very large; such transitions lie at the base of explanations for many species-rich, widelydistributed and abundant groups. Maynard Smith and Szathmary’s major transitions are
all examples of this category.

4

DISCOVERING EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITIONS

‘The processes of life can be adequately displayed only in the course of life throughout
the long ages of its existence’ (Simpson 1960: 9).

We want to know something about the history of life on earth that can be deduced
from properly understood relationships of groups of species—rare and old events, processes occurring on time scales longer than the lifespan of single species, events that had a
significant impact on the evolution of species and the ecosystems they form. For evolutionary explanations, the nature of the organism is most strongly embodied in phylogeny,
the history of descent with modification which accounts for most similarities among organisms as well as the evolutionary lineages they form.
Phylogenetic systematics provides biologists with a rigorous methodology to help
study both the patterns and mechanisms of evolution (Brooks and McLennan, 2002). As a
consequence of that and renewed interest in a broader and more inclusive view of evolutionary theory, a new perspective has emerged within empirical biology, based on the
concept that evolution is a complex phenomenon resulting from various interacting processes, termed ‘forces’ or ‘constraints,’ operating on different temporal and spatial scales.
Evolutionary processes that occur at rates fast enough to be manifested as change within
a single macrospecies are included within the domain of microevolution. By contrast,
processes that occur at such slow rates that their effects are manifested in among-species
patterns, are macroevolutionary. Microevolution and macroevolution are thus considered
to be inextricably entwined as parts of a more inclusive whole, each domain represented
by the hierarchical nature of biological systems (Salthe, 1985, 1993). If macroevolution is
neither autonomous from, nor reducible to, microevolution, robust evolutionary explanations must integrate require data from both sources. For example, because macroevolutionary processes operate so slowly, they help define the boundaries within which microevolution takes place. That is, they can affect the ways in which and the extent to which
local populations respond to selection pressures.
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5

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORY

Brooks and Wiley (1988) asserted that history plays a central role in evolutionary irreversibility. Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) gave form to this intuition by suggesting that biological processes become effectively irreversible whenever two or more individually improbable events (stemming from either the nature of the organism or the nature of the conditions) effect an inheritable change in the nature of the organism. The
odds against two improbable events occurring at the same time in the proper sequence for
a specific biological system at any particular time under particular circumstances are astronomically large. History decreases those odds when the first improbable event becomes incorporated into the retained evolutionary history (heredity transmitted information) of a species. The second improbable event can now occur at any time, in any place,
and the species will respond accordingly. In other words, history increases the probability
that the first improbable event will still be part of the system when a second improbable
event occurs.
Brooks and Wiley (1988) further suggested that cohesive properties of biological
systems ranging from cell-cell adhesion and recognition, to sexual reproduction and specific mate recognition systems, to common phylogenetic history, are especially important
to evolutionary explanations. For them, cohesive properties of living systems limit both
the ways and the extent to which populations can respond to environmental selection, and
are the ‘glue’ of functional integration and hierarchical organization so characteristic of
biological systems (Wake and Roth, 1989). Many biological processes that give rise to
irreversible behaviour manifest such changes as a result of interactions among cohesive
factors, which tend to keep biological systems intact and stable in the face of environmental perturbations, and diversifying factors, which tend to split them into separate systems. Speciation in sexually reproducing species, for example, results when developmental and reproductive constraints acting as cohesive forces maintaining a macrospecies as a
single lineage are overridden by environmental forces—the best known of which is geographic isolation severing information flow that splits the lineage apart into descendant
macrospecies (Wiley, 1981). This is the reason Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995)
associated the origin of sex with the origin of true biological species—sex (including the
self-repair capabilities of DNA in sexual reproduction; Bernstein et al., 1988) is informationally cohesive at the level of multiple local lineages (microspecies). Brooks and Wiley
(1988) thus proposed that the cohesive nature of sex was a critical part of resolving the
dilemma of the ‘cost of sex’. In a complementary fashion, the environmental boundaries
within which each species lives might be pronounced enough in some cases to be consid-
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ered extrinsic cohesion in the form of stabilizing selection (Collier, 1998, 2000). Again,
each of the major transitions of Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) are associated with
the emergence of a novel form of cohesion. Interestingly, this view returns us to Darwin
(1872: 158), “Homologous parts tend to vary in the same manner, and homologous parts
tend to cohere.”

6

EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITIONS IN A COEVOLUTIONARY
SYSTEM

The coevolutionary history of leaf beetles (Ophraella) and their host plants presented by
Knowles et al. (1999) provides an excellent illustration of all three categories of evolutionary transitions (see Figure and for further details, see Brooks and McLennan, 2002).

Taking advantage of opportunities: exploring plesiomorphic (or very similar) host space

Host genus
= Solidago
= Chrysopsis
= Eupatorium

Host tribe
Astereae
Eupatorieae

Changing the rules:
exploring novel host space

= Ambrosia
= Iva

Heliantheae

= Helianthus
= Artemisiae

Anthemideae

Getting into the game (become phytophagous)

Figure 1: Three categories of evolutionary transitions in coevolution in the evolution of Ophraella. Dotted
lines = category 1; bold lines = category 2; thick line at base of phylogenetic tree = category 3 (this occurred prior to the origin of Ophraella).
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Most of the speciation in the group took place within the context of the ancestral
host resource, i.e. staying with the ancestral host during speciation, or speciating in association with host switching among members of the same tribe (transition category 1).
Many of those events evidently occurred in a burst during the Plio-Pleistocene, a time of
substantial environmental change (Knowles et al., 1999: see Brooks and McLennan, 2002
for other studies suggesting periodic bursts of speciation). This implies that rates of
speciation may have increased during that period of environmental crisis because the beetles were given the opportunity to host switch e.g., increased sympatry of previously allopatric hosts bearing the plesiomorphic resource as organisms were forced together in rapidly shrinking refuge areas. These transitions occurred as a result of a change in the nature of the conditions alone. Colonization of more distantly related host plants (transition
category 2) encompasses fewer events, and as yet there is no indication that these events
were correlated with each other or with any particular episode of environmental change.
These transitions likely involved the evolution of novel abilities enabling the insects to
utilize new host resources (a change in the nature of the organism) leading to novel
Ophraella/plant associations, adding to the evolutionary complexity of the dimensions of
the arena and adding new rules to the game (in the form of new types of associations).
Finally, that Ophraella spp. are herbivores in the first place is phylogenetically conservative in the Chrysomelidae (all of which are herbivores). Is the evolution of herbivory
an example of transition (transition category 3)? To answer this question, we must consider the origin of herbivory in animals in general. I believe herbivory is a good candidate
as a major transition in evolution, although not immediately recognizable as such. That
there are tremendous ecological benefits and impacts of herbivory on both the power and
stability of ecosystems (Ulanowicz, 1986, 1997) and on the structure of communities
(Brown, 1995; Maurer, 1999) is uncontested. The link between the stability, resilience,
and persistence of ecosystems in which herbivory plays a role and increased efficiency of
information storage and transfer associated with Maynard Smith and Szathmary’s major
transitions is indirect but clearly inferred from those ecological benefits.
No metazoan has ever evolved the ability to digest cellulose. Whether this means it
is impossible, or merely that it is so improbable that is has not yet happened, is unknown.
Nonetheless, in order for metazoans to be herbivores, they need help. Three things must
happen, each of which is a priori improbable: (1) obtain a source of cellulose-digesting
microbes or protists; (2) provide a suitable environment for them in the intestine; and (3)
provide a mechanism for passing them on to your offspring. According to Maynard Smith
and Szathmary (1995), this should be sufficient to ensure that the adoption of herbivory is
15

irreversible—it is an evolutionary transition. The fossil record suggests that this is so;
during the major extinction events, herbivores become extinct, and the re-emergence of
terrestrial ecosystems is associated with the evolution of herbivory in a few surviving
lineages of faunivores (Sues, 2000). The evolutionary cost of herbivory is that it is difficult to achieve, thereby explaining why herbivory is not the ancestral feeding mode in
any major metazoan group (with the possible exception of the Mollusca), why it has
originated so few times, and why its origin cannot be predicted in advance (Sues, 2000).
The evolutionary benefits are manifestly large, sufficient to structure and power terrestrial ecosystems globally, thereby explaining the evolutionary success (in terms of geographic distribution, species richness, and total biomass) of the lineages in which it arises.
This is the manner in which herbivory is associated with increased efficiency of information storage and transfer, an essential aspect of Maynard Smith and Szathmary’s concept
of major transitions. Finally, we need to ask if herbivory requires special conditions. I
believe this may be true, although again in an indirect manner. Given the enormous evolutionary payoffs accruing to those lineages that become herbivorous, it is possible that
the first lineages adopting this mode of life proliferate and diversify so rapidly that they
themselves effectively change the nature of the conditions such that it become increasingly difficult for new lineages to establish themselves at all, and or them to become
widespread if they do become established (pre-emptive competition, or ‘survival of the
first’). In population genetics, this is known as the Allee Effect; a further implication of
this is that the newer version of a trait may actually be better adapted than the older, but
not so much that the advantage of the ubiquitous nature of the older trait can be overcome
by displacive competition. New origins of herbivory are inhibited unless those conditions
are fundamentally changed again, as in the case of major extinctions due to global environmental catastrophes or change. In this manner, a fundamental (but a priori difficult to
achieve) change in the nature of the organism leads to a fundamental change in the nature
of the conditions. Maynard Smith (1976) noted that much of the environment (nature of
the conditions) relevant to biological systems consists of products of genealogical processes (see also Brook and Wiley, 1988). I thus believe that herbivory qualifies as a major
transition in evolution.

7

EVALUATING EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITIONS

The above discussion invokes a simple cost/benefit argument to help classify a particular type of evolutionary transition. I believe this is potentially a useful means of
evaluating proposed evolutionary transitions. The informational nature of the organism
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ensures the existence of independent relatively autonomous entities occupying the same
space at the same time, which also provides the possibility of evolutionary conflicts of
interest. As evolutionary diversification proceeds from the origin of life, the diversification of species, all confined to this single planet, made such conflicts inevitable. Biological research has demonstrated that such conflicts of interest abound; indeed, the existence
of such conflicts arising from the relatively autonomous nature of the organism creates
the various selection arenas (Brooks, 2000, 2001). More fundamentally, in a world controlled by the Second Law of Thermodynamics there is no free lunch; everything is a
trade-off, beginning with the most fundamental issues of trade-offs between energy used
and work done, between energy stored as structure (biomass, including the information
system itself) and energy dissipated as a result of making and maintaining that structure.
To the extent that biological information has a material basis, it must have an energetic
cost, which must be assessed in the context of survival.

8

THE MACROEVOLUTIONARY COST/BENEFIT ARENA

The simplest cost/benefit arena can be depicted as a 2 X 2 contingency table, depicting interactions between two binary variables. Each of the four cells in such a table
represent evolutionary outcomes, sometimes called strategies, each of which specifies a
set of costs and benefits. Again in the simplest case, the cell which represents the greatest
net benefit is predicted to be the strategy observed in nature. Departures from expectations imply additional factors influencing the system. Large amounts of biological complexity can be added to cost/benefit analyses, and microevolutionary studies have used
this approach with great success.
To convert this to a macroevolutionary arena, we need to consider the evolutionary
history, i.e., the origins, of variables representing any putative evolutionary transition, to
help us explain what irreversible events happened and why, complementing predictions
of what reversible dynamic changes might happen, and why. Consider the simple case in
which one variable represents changes in the nature of the organism as ‘easy to achieve’
(cases of ecological fitting and vicariant speciation being special cases in which no
change was necessary) or ‘difficult to achieve’ while the other variable represents
changes in the nature of the conditions, represented as ‘not required’ and ‘required’. In
the simple classification presented above, category 1 transitions would be ‘easy to
achieve’ and ‘no special conditions required’, category 2 transitions would be ‘easy to
achieve’ and ‘special conditions required’ (2a) or ‘difficult to achieve’ and ‘no special
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conditions required’ (2b), and category 3 transitions would be ‘difficult to achieve’ and
‘special conditions required’.
When an evolutionary transition is associated with the origin of a species, we can
envision a set of such tables summed over the evolution of a clade (e.g., Ophraella as
discussed above) permitting us to ask questions such as, where did the clade enter the
game. Eexpanding the scale of the study phylogenetically can also answer the questions
of when did the clade enter the game and what game was it playing before? What was the
sequence of exploration of the cells? Are there any empty cells? If there are multiple occurrences of the same cell, did it arise form the same source and in the same manner in
each case? Did any member of the clade ever leave the game, and if so, from which cell,
and where did it go—including the case of going extinct?
Adopting the perspective of cost/benefit analyses also enables us to understand the
most fundamental benefit of retained history – it lowers the cost of evolution. Retained
history lowers the cost of innovation, because innovations are modifications of only part
of pre-existing information. New traits need not be produced de novo, and their expression is ‘pre-screened’ through developmental dynamics based on the non-modified components which determine whether or not the innovation is ‘permitted’ i.e. if it disrupts
overall developmental, including reproductive integrity (cohesion). Retained history also
lowers the cost of specialization—specialists on widespread persistent ancestral resources
have options for survival and evolutionary diversification under changing conditions
(ecological fitting). Finally, retained history lowers the cost of adaptability, as most
adaptability is accumulated history.
9

A RESEARCH PROGRAM FOR MACROEVOLUTIONARY
COST/BENEFIT ANALYSES

The past decade has witnessed an explosion of experimental studies informed by
phylogenetic information directly documenting evolutionary mechanisms, even those operating in the distant past. David Wake (1991) proposed that an understanding of the evolution of biological form required an integration of ‘neo-Darwinian functionalism and
biological structuralism, in a context of rigorous phylogenetic analysis’ (see also Historical Structuralism of Brooks and Wiley, 1988). This has led to two macroevolutionary
research programs, Historical Ecology (Brooks, 1985; Brooks and McLennan, 2002) and
Integrative Biology (Wake and Roth, 1989). The goal of both research programs is to
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provide rigorous explanations for the origin, persistence (stasis), and diversification of
the species traits that provide the foundation for complex evolutionary systems.
The Ophraella patterns discussed above are an example of historical ecology, and
set the stage for studies in integrative biology. Wake (1991) described the integrative biology perspective as the desire to differentiate instances of evolutionary change due to
selection (nature of the conditions) and those due to ‘design constraints’ (nature of the
organism). Integrative biology involves efforts in diverse fields including functional
morphology, neurobiology, physiology, reproductive biology, and developmental biology
(for a list of relevant publications, see Brooks and McLennan, 2002). Placing the results
of studies in integrative biology in a cost/benefit context provides a powerful research
program for evaluating the nature of evolutionary transitions. Mechanistic components of
integrative studies can tell us the costs and benefits; phylogenetic studies can tell us
where each lineage got into the game, and how many times and in what sequence it took
advantage of the opportunities, changed the rules, or even changed the game.
Retained phylogenetic history thus allows considerable biological complexity to
evolve, and survive through ecological fitting, extending the time period during which
evolutionary experiments, leading to evolutionary transitions can occur. It lowers the
global cost of evolutionary origins and persistence while not sacrificing the benefits of
local adaptation.

10 SUMMARY
The conceptual framework summarized above treats organisms and the systems
they form as information systems retaining much of their phylogenetic history. I believe
this contribution provides a glimpse of the power of that perspective in linking theoretical
(‘text’) and empirical (‘context’) research programs. There is still much to be accomplished, in terms of priorities, terminology, and better understanding of both general and
specific phenomena through both empirical studies and modelling efforts. Nonetheless, I
believe it is time to consider all such debates to be part of the vigorous activities of a
growing and progressive research program, rather than a collection of mutually exclusive
competing alternatives. This will lead us back to the panoramic view of biology in an
evolutionary context first articulated by Darwin. It will also provide hope of encompassing the enormous amount of biological discoveries since Darwin, along with more fundamental developments in statistical mechanics, non-equilibrium thermodynamics and
self-organization, information theory, and complexity theory (for additional discussion
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and references, see Wicken, 1987; Weber, Depew, and Smith, 1988; Csanyi, 1989; Matsuno, 1989; Kampis, 1991; Kauffman, 1993; Depew and Weber, 1995; Van de Vijver,
Salthe, and Delpos, 1998; and Taborsky, 2000) in a truly unifying, if not unified, theory
of biology.
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